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In this preliminary study, we proposed a mathematical information sharing model
for rival information and simulated the information sharing behaviors in systems 
confronting the social dilemma. The simulations help us understand the factors 
that influence the performance of information sharing systems and may lead to 
new approaches that solve the social dilemma.
Introduction
The development of Web2.0 has seen a wide range of systems in which people create and 
share information directly with others, such as Wikipedia, Slashdot, and Yahoo Answers. 
Whether the users are willing to share information with others is a key factor of the 
success of these large-scale Web based collaboration systems or services. Many studies 
have attempted to explain why people voluntarily participate in these collaboration 
systems. Known theories include anticipated reciprocity, increased recognition, sense of 
efficacy, and sense of community [1].
An important characteristic of these systems is that the shared information is mostly
“nonrival”, which means the information value does not change no matter whether it is
owned by one or thousands. However, there is also “rival” information, whose value
decreases once it is shared with others, such as a new business idea, or a secret parking
spot. The sharing of rival information is rare in these web communities because of the
social dilemma [2][3]: a situation where an individual’s interest conflicts with the group’s
interest. A better understanding of such phenomena may foster the sharing of rival
information in future systems.
In this preliminary study, we proposed a mathematical information sharing model for rival 
information and simulated the information sharing behaviors in systems confronting the 
social dilemma. The simulations help us understand the factors that influence the 
performance of information sharing systems and may lead to new approaches that solve 
the social dilemma.
Information sharing model
To analyze sharing trends in information-sharing systems confronting the social dilemma, 
an information sharing model was proposed:
There are two types of information: public information and private information. 
Public information is possessed by everyone in the group. Private information is 
possessed by just one person in the group.
1.
A piece of information has similar value to all individuals. When a piece of 
information is private to an individual, its value is 1; when the owner shares it with 
others, its value decreases to (1 - α).
2.
In a group of n individuals, the information flow of individual i is shown in figure 1.3.
αi is valuable information that individual i retrieves by himself; biis useful 
information he gets from others; ci is information he shares with others.
Figure 1. Information flow
We introduce a variable βi to represent an individual i’s willingness to share 
information. The greater the βi is, the more the individual i is willing to share 
4.
information with others. The Value of βi is between 1 and 0.
ci and bi can be calculated as follows:
(1)
(2)




We assume that individuals always pursue maximum interests, thus they select 
actions that bring them profits and avoid actions that make them lose profits. 
Therefore, to pursue maximum interests, the individuals adjust their βs according to 
the changes of their payoffs H(k) - H(k-1) and the previous directions dir(k) in which 
they adjusted βs:
6.
Where μi(k+1) is the pace of the adjustment; ηi(k+1) is a random variable
representing uncertainties in the adjustments of βi.
Analysis of sharing trends
Synchronous situation
Firstly, we give the theoretical deduction in a situation where individuals adjust their βs 
synchronously. Three simplifications are adopted:
The amount of valuable information retrieved by any individual during any period is 1.
the same.
There are no uncertainties in adjustment.2.
Individuals adjust their βs with uniform paces.3.
Under these simplifications, the change of payoff to individual i is:
(5)
For further analysis, equation (6) is given:
(6)
In this equation, the overall change of β in the group is mi(k) times as much as Δβi(k). If we 
use w(k) to represent the number of individuals who increase their βs and use v(k) to
represent the number of individuals who decrease their βs, we have:
(7)
(8)
According to equation (4) and (8), individual i will increase his βi when 
 , and decrease his βi when  . This leads to the 
following deduction: If , then there will not be trends toward sharing in 
the collaborative group. If , there will be trends to! ward sharing in the
collaborative group.
Using some skillful transformations, we can remove these simplifications and have most 
of our deductions unchanged.
Asynchronous situation
In the deduction in 3.1, mi(k), the imbalance of the individuals' decisions which occurs 
when individuals adjust their behaviors simultaneously is the intrinsic impetus of trends 
toward sharing in the collaborative group. This imbalance will be weakened in 
asynchronous situations since few people act simultaneously. As a result, there will not be 
clear trends toward sharing in the asynchronous systems
Simulation
We present results of a simulation with a group of 50 individuals. In the simulation, each 
individual adjusted his cooperative degree β to pursue the maximum interest. βs took 
values in the interval of (0,1) and were assigned random values at the beginning of the
simulation. The distribution of βs was used as our result after performing a thousand trials.
The simulation was repeated for three different values of α (0.5,0.9,0.99). 
Figure 2 shows the simulation results. The x-axis is people’s willingness to share. The y-axis
is the percentage of people. Each curve shows people’s willingness to share under a
certain α value. The results conform our theoretical analysis: there are obvious sharing 
(α=0.5, 0.9) and unsharing (α=0.99) trends in the simplified synchronous situation while 
no obviously sharing trends in the asynchronous situation.




This poster presents an effort to understand the sharing of rival information in a group. The
theoretical deduction and the simulations suggest that sharing trends may appear more 
easily in synchronous situations than asynchronous situations. In asynchronous situations, 
which is the case for most online information sharing systems, more incentive mechanism
are needed to foster sharing of rival information. The current information sharing model is 
still preliminary. Future work will focus on refining the model with findings from empirical 
studies on information sharing behaviors. 
References
Kollock, P. 1999. "The Economies of Online Cooperation: Gifts and Public Goods in 
Cyberspace,"  Communities in Cyberspace.  Marc Smith and Peter Kollock (editors). 
London: Routledge.
Glance, N.S. and Huberman, B. A. 1994.  The Dynamics of Social Dilemmas,  Scientific 
American,  270, pp. 76-81.
Lichbach, M. I. 1996.  The Cooperator's Dilemma.  University of Michigan Press, Ann 
Arbor.
